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ARBITRATION OF TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT 
CLAIMS 
MARSHALLE.TRACHT 
In recent years, it has become increasingly common for lenders to include arbi-
tration clauses in their consumer financing agreements. While foderallaw 
strongly supports the enforceability of arbitration provisions, there are a num-
ber of grounds on which their enforceability can be, and has been, challenged. 
This article summarizes the state of the law on a number of major issues 
which have arisen in the attempt to use arbitration clauses in consumer financ-
ing agreements, focusing on Truth-in-Lending Act claims, including an analysis 
of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
Randolph. 
I
n recent years, many financial institutions have begun adding arbitration 
clauses to their consumer financial agreements, believing arbitration to 
be a less expensive and friendlier forum than state or federal courts. 
Among the most important advantages of mandatory arbitration is that it 
may prevent consumers from converting their individual complaints into 
class action lawsuits. Despite strong public policies favoring arbitration, 
however, courts sometimes decline to enforce such agreements, on a variety 
of grounds: that the arbitration clause is unconscionable, that it conflicts 
with the fundamental purposes of the Truth in Lending Act or other statu-
tory protections, or that the arbitration procedures specified were too costly 
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for the consumer or otherwise unfair. 
Many had been looking forward to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, I a case concerning the enforceability 
of an arbitration clause contained in a mobile home financing agreement, as 
a potential source of guidance on these various issues. Although the deci-
sion, issued this past December, addressed only two fairly narrow issues, it 
nonetheless provides an opportune moment to review the state of the law in 
this increasingly important area. 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
Historically, courts were highly resistant to arbitration agreements, 
believing that they improperly deprived the courts of their rightful jurisdic-
tion.2 To overcome this judicial hostility Congress passed the Federal 
Arbitration Act in 1925,3 providing that arbitration clauses were to be treat-
ed as binding in the same manner as every other contractual agreement: 
A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy arising our of such 
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part 
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.4 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the FAA evinces a 
strong federal policy favoring arbitration agreements and that courts must 
"rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."5 Moreover, in interpreting an 
arbitration clause, "due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring 
arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself 
resolved in favor of arbitration. "6 
Despite the policies favoring arbitration, however, there are grounds on 
which an arbitration clause may be held unenforceable. As the FAA states, 
arbitration clauses are valid and enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity" to challenge any contract. Thus, an arbitration clause will 
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not be enforced where one party has not consented to the provision, or 
where the clause is unconscionable, or if arbitration poses an inherent con-
flict with other important public policies. 
CONSENT TO ARBITRATION 
A threshold inquiry in any attempt to compel arbitration of a claim is 
whether the other party has in fact consented to arbitration.? Courts have 
split on the evidence that will be adequate to prove consent, however. Some 
have applied a relatively lenient standard, holding that the consent required 
to bind a party to an arbitration clause is no greater than that required for 
any other provision. Thus, an arbitration clause included in the fine print of 
a contract may be enforceable, even if the consumer never noticed it.8 
In Marsh v. First USA Bank,9 for example, the court upheld the enforce-
ability of an arbitration clause contained in an amendment to the credit card 
agreement that had been sent to the consumer as in insert to a monthly state-
ment. Although the card holders alleged that they did not receive notice of 
the provision, the court held that the evidence showing that the insert had 
in all probability been mailed was sufficient to raise the presumption that the 
card holders had received the insert. Affidavits by the card holders alleging 
that they had not received the insert were insufficient to rebut this pre-
sumption absent evidence of irregularities or carelessness in the process of 
sending the inserts to card holders.lO Thus, the card holders were presumed 
to have had notice of the arbitration provision, and it was enforceable against 
them despite their allegation that they had never seen or been aware of the 
provision. 
Other courts, however, have held that an arbitration clause is not bind-
ing on a consumer who has not knowingly agreed to submit to arbitration. II 
Though these courts acknowledge that arbitration clauses may not be sin-
gled out for stricter scrutiny than other contract clauses. 
UNCONSCIONABILITY 
A court always has the option of refusing to enforce a provision that is 
"unconscionable." Although the law varies from state to state, most states 
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require a showing of both procedural unconscionability and substantial 
unconscionability to apply the doctrine.12 
The procedural unconscionability issue may be relatively easy for plain-
tiffs to prevail on in many consumer cases. After all, the arbitration clauses 
at issue are "take it or leave it" propositions for the consumer, and so many 
courts will consider them to be terms of adhesion. 13 
The question of substantive unconscionability is more difficult, how-
ever. There are almost as many statements of the standard for substantive 
unconscionability as there are cases on the subject, but generally it requires 
a showing of grossly inequitable terms, of terms so one sided as to be 
oppressive. 14 
Consumers have sometimes argued that arbitration clauses were not 
enforceable because they lacked "mutuality"-that is, they did not impose 
the obligation to arbitrate equally on both sides. 15 Not surprisingly, courts 
eventually began to reject this claim, noting that, as in other areas of con-
tract, mutuality in any particular term is not required so long as the contract 
as a whole is supported by consideration. 16 However, the concept of mutual-
ity appears to be retaining at least some vitality under the guise of uncon-
scionability. Courts have most often struck down arbitration clauses as 
unconscionable where the clause provided different rights for the business 
and the consumer. Thus, a provision that permitted an insurer to appeal any 
arbitration award in excess of a given amount, but that did not permit the 
consumer to appeal if the award was less, has been held unconscionable. 17 A 
number of decisions in this area are particularly troubling for lenders, who 
have good reasons for wanting to except certain actions (to enforce a note or 
foreclose on collateral, for example) from arbitration. Some courts have held 
that such provisions are unfair and unenforceable because they preserve 
access to the courts for the lender, but not for the borrower. IS Other courts, 
not surprisingly, have rejected these challenges. 19 
ARBITRATION MUST BE FAIR 
In practice, the unconscionability analysis often blends into a separate 
line of argument, that the arbitration provided for by the contract is itself 
biased or unfair. For an arbitration clause to be enforceable, the arbitration 
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process must offer an adequate forum for the resolution of the dispute and 
must not deprive the plaintiff of the ability to vindicate her rights. Thus, 
courts have been willing to strike down arbitration clauses where the arbi-
tration forum was unduly costly, reasoning that extreme costs effectively 
deny relief to the complainant.20 Courts have also denied arbitration where 
the arbitrator appeared to be biased21 or the arbitration proceedings did not 
provide minimal procedural protections.22 
In Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp., Green Tree had financed the 
plaintiff's purchase of a mobile home. The plaintiff later filed a class action 
suit under TILA and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, alleging that the 
defendant had failed to properly identify certain lender's insurance premi-
ums as a financing cost. The trial court granted Green Tree's motion to com-
pel arbitration, dismissed all other claims, and declined to certify the class. 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit refused to compel the arbitration ofTILA 
claims, holding the arbitration provision unenforceble because it failed to 
address the payment of filing fees, the apportionment of the costs of arbi-
tration or whether, if the plaintiff prevailed, fees and costs would exceed any 
award. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the contract "fail[ed] to provide 
the minimum guaranties required to ensure that [the plaintiff's] ability to 
vindicate her statutory rights [under the TILA would] not be undone by 
steep filing fees, steep arbitrators' fees, or other high costs of arbitration."23 
Given the limited damages available to the plaintiff in many TILA suits, 
particularly if the avenue of a class action has been foreclosed, it is likely that 
even modest arbitration costs could exceed the possible recovery. In Wood v. 
Cooper Chevrolet, for example, the court refused to order arbitration of a 
TILA claim under the American Arbitration Association rules, which pro-
vide for arbitration costs to be equally shared unless the arbitrator orders 
otherwise, even though the defendant had agreed to front the arbitration 
costs. The court reasoned that if a defendant retains the right to seek reim-
bursement of the costs after the proceeding, this renders TILA claims "eco-
nomically unfeasable," and "the purpose of the TILA will be eviscerated 
because potential defendants will have no incentive to abide by its provi-
sions."24 
If allowed to stand, the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Green Tree 
and of Cooper Chevrolet would be troubling for lenders, to say the least. 
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Cooper Chevrolet does not definitively say that the defendant must surrender 
the right to seek reimbursement of fees by order of the arbitrator should the 
defendant prevail, but that is certainly a plausible reading of the case. Under 
this strict standard, the only way a defendant could enforce an arbitration 
clause is to agree to pay the fees of arbitration and to forego the right to 
recover those fees from the plaintiff. Moreover, the court does not address 
why a plaintiff is harmed by having to pay arbitration costs when the alter-
native is to file a law suit, a process likely to be as or more expensive.25 
The Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree should provide lenders with 
at least some comfort on this score. The Court addressed two issues: first, 
whether the district court's order was a "final order" subject to immediate 
appeal; and second, whether the failure ro deal with the costs of arbitration 
rendered the clause unenforceable. 
On the first question, the Court held that the district court's order com-
pelling arbitration and dismissing all claims was a final order amenable to 
immediate appeal.26 This ruling can be seen as a victory for consumers and 
plaintiffs' attorneys. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, it is clear that an 
order denying arbitration is immediately appealable, so lenders seeking to 
enforce an arbitration provisions have always had the opportunity to seek 
review of an adverse ruling.27 
The Court's holding that an order compelling arbitration and dismissing 
all other claims is an appealable final order now increases the likelihood that 
a consumer challenging the enforceability of an arbitration clause will be able 
to appeal an adverse ruling without first submitting to the arbitration. 
On the question of costs, however, the Court's ruling favored arbitrabil-
ity. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held the arbitration 
clause enforceable despite Randolph's allegation that steep arbitration fees 
might render arbitration inaccessible to her.28 High fees might be grounds 
to invalidate an arbitration clause, according to the Court, but the burden 
rests on the party resisting arbitration to show that it would be unduly 
expensive, an evidentiary burden that Randolph did not meet.29 Any other 
ruling, according to Justice Rehnquist, would "undermine the liberal feder-
al policy favoring arbitration agreements."30 
As the Court noted, many arbitration services have consumer arbitra-
tion provisions or small claims provisions that keep consumer fees to a min-
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imum in many cases.3) The clause in Green Tree was silent as to the arbitra-
tion provider, but many clauses specify the organization or rules that will 
govern the arbitration proceeding. An arbitration clause specifying that arbi-
tration will be according to the rules of an organization with reasonable con-
sumer arbitration provisions should preclude a challenge like Randolph's. 
Indeed, in the wake of Green Tree, an arbitration clause that is silent as to the 
arbitration rules should be valid provided the defendant agree to arbitration 
in a forum with reasonable provisions governing consumer fees. 
It is important to note, however, that the Court did not reject the under-
lying premise of the Circuit Court's opinion, which is that high arbitration 
costs may render an arbitration provision unenforceable. Indeed, the Court 
recognized this point, holding only that Randolph could not prevail by 
showing that the agreement was silent as to costs; rather, she had to be put 
on affirmative evidence as the costs to which she would be subjected. This 
clarification regarding the burden of proof is an important, but partial, vic-
tory for lenders. 
It is worth noting two issues that the Supreme Court expressly declined 
to address. First, the Court stated that Randolph had not argued that the 
Congress intended for the Truth-in-Lending Act to preclude a waiver of 
judicial remedies, so the Court did not address that question.32 On a close-
ly related point, the Court also declined to consider whether the arbitration 
clause could be held unenforceable because arbitration would effectively 
deny the plaintiff the ability to proceed with her class action claims.33 It is to 
this latter issue that we now turn. 
ARBITRATION AND CLASS ACTION SUITS 
One of the most important potential benefits of binding arbitration is 
that it may preclude a consumer from filing a class action lawsuit against the 
defendant. It is not necessarily impossible for an arbitrator to preside over a 
consolidated or class action proceeding B courts in both California and 
Pennsylvania have blessed the concept of class action arbitration proceed-
ings.34 However, federal courts have generally resisted the idea of class action 
arbitration absent explicit contractual language permitting it, arguing that 
"[f]or a federal court to read such a term into the parties' agreement would 
9 
BANKING LAW JOURNAL 
disrupt the negotiated risk/benefit allocation and direct [the parties] to pro-
ceed with a different sort of arbitration."35 
Moreover, class action arbitrations are precluded by the rules and proce-
dures of many arbitration agencies. If the arbitration clause provides that 
arbitration will be handled by a particular organization, and that organiza-
tion's rules do not permit class action arbitrations, then enforcement of the 
arbitration clause will prevent the consumer from enlarging the suit to 
encompass an entire class of plaintiffs. 
However, if class actions and arbitration are inconsistent, that does not 
necessarily determine which should prevail in a conflict. In the last two 
years, courts have split over the enforceability of a mandatory arbitration 
clause that has the effect of precluding a class action lawsuit.36 Many of these 
cases have been fought out in the context of technical Truth in Lending Act 
claims, where a single plaintiff would be limited to $1,000 in damages, but 
a class could obtain an award of up to $500,000.37 Obviously, absent the class 
action mechanism, few consumers (or plaintiffs' attorneys) would bring suits 
alleging purely technical violations ofTILA. 
The argument advanced by plaintiffs in these cases is that class action 
lawsuits are the primary means of enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act, 
and that Congress created an explicit right under TILA for plaintiffs to bring 
class actions. The standard for such a claim, asserting a conflict between the 
FAA and another statutory right, was set out by the Supreme Court in 
ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon: 
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The [FAA], standing alone, therefore mandates enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate statutory claims. Like any statutory directive, the 
[FAA's] mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional com-
mand. The burden is on the party opposing arbitration, however, to 
show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies 
for the statutory rights at;)ssue. If Congress did intend to limit or pro-
hibit waiver of a judicial forum for a particular claim, such an intent 
will be deducible from [the statute's] text or legislative history, or from 
an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying 
purposes.38 
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Many of the TILA cases have hinged on the court's analysis of the role 
of class action litigation in TILA's the enforcement scheme. Those courts 
that have found that Congress expressly granted to plaintiffs the right to 
bring class action suits have generally concluded that arbitration cannot be 
ordered, as it deprives the plaintiff of an essential remedy. In Lozada v. Dale 
Banker Oldsmobile, for example, the federal district court declined to order 
arbitration ofTILA claims, reasoning that by precluding class action litiga-
tion, "the remedial purposes ofTILA are substantially defeated or impaired 
by arbitration clauses such as the clause in this case."39 
The district court in Johnson v. Tete-Cash, Inc. accepted the same argu-
ment, only to be reversed by the Third Circuit, which reasoned that TILA 
does not create a substantive right to bring a class action and that the class 
action device is merely procedural.40 Thus, arbitration may be compelled 
without depriving the plaintiff of a substantive right or remedy. Moreover, 
the court held that there is no inherent conflict between arbitration and 
TILA's statutory scheme. The court rejected the argument that arbitration, 
by precluding class action suits, would eliminate the incentive for plaintiffs 
to bring TILA action, noting that a class action does necessarily result in 
higher awards for the individual plaintiff and that attorneys' fees are avail-
able under TILA and can be awarded by an arbitrator.4! 
Regardless of the outcome of this debate, however, plaintiffs will seek 
ways to maintain class actions in many cases. If the availability of a class 
action is explicitly provided under another statute (such as state consumer 
protection laws, for example), then the plaintiff may prevail on the argument 
that those claims are not arbitrable.42 Even such a finding, however, will not 
prevent the court from ordering that arbitrable claims be submitted to arbi-
tration regardless of how intertwined the arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims 
may be.43 The result may be an increase in dispute resolution costs, as relat-
ed matters are handled in parallel proceedings (although the court proceed-
ing will often be stayed pending resolution of the arbitration).44 
CONCLUSION 
There are many pitfalls to be avoided in the drafting of an arbitration 
clause, and it still unclear precisely what terms may be permitted, and which 
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may created problems down the road. Lenders must be particularly con-
cerned about those cases which cast doubt on the enforceability of an arbi-
tration clause that retains the lender's right to bring various actions, particu-
lar real or personal property foreclosure actions, in court. Provisions that 
saddle consumers with undue costs, or that forbid the award of attorney's 
fees to a prevailing consumer, may also be problematic. On the vital ques-
tion, however, of whether arbitration clauses can shield a lender from con-
sumer class action litigation, the answer appears to be trending towards 
"yes". 
However, until the Supreme Court (or Congress) provides a definitive 
rule, lenders should consider it a weak shield at best. A!; long as some dis-
tricts or circuits are willing to hold that TlLA class action suits are not 
amenable to arbitration, this will be an element in the forum selection deci-
sion made by plaintiffs' attorneys, not a bar to class action proceedings. 
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